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1. Context and motivation  
 
The global trend of re-organizing the academic world according to the competitive logic of a 
global marketplace imposes considerable changes in the working conditions in academia. In 
several countries, the growing pressure for audit and evaluation of public spending on higher 
education and research has driven to the widespread use of “research assessments,” both for 
the allocation of public funding and for the management of human resources within 
universities. One specific instrument in this trend is the use of metrics to quantify “research 
output” and its “impact” in terms of citations. 
A significant number of researchers, journals and scientific societies signed a joint declaration 
calling for critical approach to research performance metrics and proposing a redefinition of 
“responsible” metrics that should account for diversity and reflexivity (2013 San Francisco 
DORA; HEFCE, 2015). This implies that metrics should reflect and support the plurality of 
research and researchers, and all systemic and potential effects of indicators should be 
anticipated before using them on a large scale. Yet, in a recent article Bayer and Rouse, 2016, 
conclude that “the field of economics is behind others in its progress on diversity concerns” 
(p. 238). From a gender perspective, economics exhibits the highest gender gaps in tenure and 
promotion rates, salaries and job satisfaction among both the social sciences (Ginther, Kahn, 
2006) and math-intensive fields (Ceci, Ginther, Kahn, Williams, 2014).  
Increasingly, women (and men) must adopt to a standardized and stereotypically ‘manly’ 
research profile, in order to find employment and then progress in an academic career. In this 
paper we analyze the case of Italy, which exhibits common features with several other 
countries such as a severe gender gap, the massive use of bibliometric indicators, rankings 
and indexes, and a centralized system of research evaluation. Italy is a very instructive 
example at the international level both for the laudable transparency of its new “national 
scientific qualification” (ASN) system, and because it historically exhibit substantial diversity 
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of research programs in economics, which is now being quickly compressed (Corsi et al., 
2016).  
The paper is organized as follows: section 2 presents a literature review on diversity in 
economics profession; section 3 introduces the Italian context, giving some evidence about 
the underrepresentation of women in academia and the glass ceiling effect in economics in 
Italian universities. Section 4 describes the data and methodology used for the identification 
of  ‘institutional discrimination,’ and in section 5 we present the results of our analysis. 
 
 
2. Diversity in the economics profession 
 
The economists’ failure at predicting the recent financial crisis gave a new impulse to the 
advocacy for diversity in the economics profession. In a widely discussed report after the 
crisis, the Independent Evaluation Office (IEO) of the International Monetary Fund 
encouraged thoughtful and diverse opinions within the Fund, denouncing how an environment 
that discouraged diverse and dissenting views led the Fund to deemphasize macroeconomic 
and financial risks and vulnerabilities during the years of the “great moderation” (IEO, 2009). 
Similarly, the Federal Reserve underlined how diversity is an enriching factor for the 
development of economic theory and for the understanding of current reality.1  
Indeed, extant literature is characterized by two parallel approaches to the analysis of 
diversity in the economics profession.  
One strand of literature analyses the contribution of women to the discipline. Within this first 
category, we can however distinguish different approaches. On the one hand, Dimand et al. 
(2000, 2011), Ciccarelli and Ciccarelli (2003) and Madden et al. (2004), following a 
historical-narrative approach, analyze the contributions of women economists of the past that 
do not appear in the standard history of economic thought texts. Groenewegen and King 
(1994) provide a statistical analysis of women’s contributions from 1900 to 1939 in top 
economic journals, analyzing 112 women authors of 222 articles. Madden (2002) provides a 
broader survey of women researchers, including less known titles, by considering 1160 
women authors of economics journal articles published between 1900 and 1940.  
On the other hand, several researchers focus on gender differences in the economists’ 
methodologies, research approaches and interests. Thus, Davis (1997), Davis et al. (2011), 
Hedengren et al. (2010) and Stastny (2010) find that women typically reach a much stronger 
consensus, especially on issues of equity and fairness both in the economics profession and in 
policy recommendations calling for greater government intervention in the economy. Albelda 
(1997) focuses on how men economists are much less interested in topics such as women’s 
labour force participation, the impact of fiscal and monetary policies on women and families, 
wage discrimination, and the economic status of minority women. More recently, May et al. 
(2014) report significant gender differences in the approach to policies such as minimum 
wages, health insurance and equal opportunities in the labor market. Finally, some studies 
examined the evolution of gender differences in scientific production in economics. For 
example, Forget (1995) analyses the evolution of PhD’s dissertations in economics from 1912 
to 1940 in the USA, while Dolado et al. (2008), studying the scientific production of tenured 
economists in top international departments, address cohorts’ differences in the research 
fields’ preferences of men and women. For the case of Italy, Zacchia (2016) finds that 
progressively more competitive environment heavily founded on bibliometrics, forced women 
to adopt a ‘homologation’ strategy to reach the top of the academic career. She reports 
evidence of a double converge path for Italian academic economists in the last decade: 
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women and men tend to converge to the same research interests and concurrently men tend to 
homologate at a faster pace to a univocal concept of excellence in research. This consistent 
reduction in diversity in economics, mainly identified with the concept of pluralism of 
research, is particularly evident when studying how women reduce their scientific production 
in less mainstream fields, mainly heterodox economics and history of economic thought, in 
the last decades. 
The second strand of literature focuses on institutions and human resources’ organization 
within research centers. The main object of analysis here is how universities can best provide 
a research environment that benefits from the creativity and productivity of diverse research 
groups. From this perspective, equality is central both in terms of equal opportunities for 
individuals and of performance of organizations. Acker (1990) argues that organizations are 
gendered processes where “advantage and disadvantage, exploitation and control, action and 
emotion, meaning and identity, are patterned through and in terms of a distinction between 
male and female, masculine and feminine” (Acker, 1990, p. 146). Universities are not 
different, and it is important to stress that all internal processes, department organization, 
research activities, criteria for evaluation and career paths in academia are all gendered 
(Acker, 2008; Johansson and Śliwa, 2014). 
Concerning the case of Italy, gender discrimination in academia has been recently 
documented through behavioral and experimental studies focusing on gender differences in 
competitive environments, and on the impact of the gender composition of selection 
committees on the likelihood of obtaining tenure in Italian universities (Scoppa and De Paola 
2015, 2016; Abramo et al. 2016; Bagues et al. 2016). The results of these studies are 
controversial: Abramo et al. 2016 and Bagues et al. 2016 find no empirical support to suggest 
that the presence of (a few) women in evaluation committees has a statistically or 
economically significant positive effect on the chances of success of women candidates. 
Strikingly, Bagues et al. 2016, in most subsamples, find that gender-mixed committees tend to 
be less favorable towards female candidates than all-male committees are. On the contrary, 
Checchi et al. 2015 and De Paola et al. 2015 report a positive role of women presence in 
commission in promoting women candidates. Nevertheless, De Paola et al. (2016) find that 
the introduction in 2012 of the new recruitment and promotion system in Italian universities  
has not increased women’s probability of being effectively promoted both for associate and 
full professorship (for women, the probability of being promoted is, ceteris paribus, 12% and 
20% less than that of their men colleagues, respectively). 
In this work, we analyze the intersection of these two strands of literature. We study how the 
use of standardized bibliometric measures in the decisions on promotion to associate or full 
professors can influence scientific production economics. We document the a trend towards 
homologation and lack of pluralism in terms of research fields concentration, and how this 
trend differently affects women and men economists.  
 
 
3. The glass ceiling in economics  
 
In order to quantify the difficulties faced by women in gaining access to the top position we 
compute the Glass Ceiling Index (GCI) for Italian academic economists. The GCI is a 
measure proposed by the European Commission in its She Figures report. The index 
compares the proportion of women in academia with the proportion of women in top 
academic positions (full professors). The GCI can range from 0 to infinity: a GCI of 1 
indicates that there is no difference between women and men in terms of their chances of 
being promoted; a score of less than 1 implies that women are more represented at the top 
level than in academia generally; and a GCI greater than 1 indicates that women are less 
represented in full professorship positions than in academia generally. Thus, the higher the 
value of the GCI, the stronger the glass ceiling effect. 
In Italy, the GCI accounts for 1.71 in 2015	in academia generally, ranging from 1.29 for the 
humanities and arts to 1.78 for mathematics and computing.2 In economics, the GCI is even 
higher: 1.85 in 2015, compared to 2.55 in 2000.3 Thus, there has been some progress towards 
reducing the glass ceiling effect, although women continue to be less-represented in full 
professorship in economics than in academia generally.  
In 2015, women represent 36.5% of the Italian academic staff. In economics, the share of 
women is even lower (30.3%); 16% of full professors in economics are women, as well 32% 
of associate professors, and 46% of researchers. As a consequence, for women there is a 
classic pyramid structure of employment, with 19% of women full professors at the top, 
followed by the associate professors (27%), and researchers at the base of the pyramid (54%). 
By contrast, for men the hierarchical structure takes on the shape of a reverse pyramid, with 
the largest share represented by full professors (41%), followed by the associate professors 
(30%), and finally by researchers (29%). With respect to year 2000, the pyramidal structure 
stayed the same for both sexes, even as the share of women full professors grew from to 15% 
to 19%.  
The underrepresentation of women in economic research in Italy is much smaller at the PhD 
level. In a context in which the number of students has almost doubled (from 45 in 2002 to 
108 in 2014, the last year for which data are available), the share of women pursuing a PhD in 
economics remained roughly constant: from 41.8% in 2002 to 42.5% in 2014.4 Thus, one 
could talk of a ‘leaky pipeline’ effect for women economists in Italy’s universities. 
 
 
3.1 The Italian institutional context 
 
In Italy the quality of both research centers and individuals is assessed at a centralized level, 
respectively for financing and for hiring and promotion aims. Concerning the evaluation of 
individuals, recently a 2010 reform of the university system (Law 240/2010) created a 
“national scientific qualification” (ASN) system in order to access associate and full professor 
positions. “Professore associato” is now the lower tenured rank in Italian academia, roughly 
corresponding to a senior lecturer or associate professor position; and “professore ordinario” 
is the higher rank (corresponding to full professor).5 Individuals who obtain a national 
qualification as associate or full professor can then compete at the local level, for a job at the 
corresponding rank at any Italian university. Thus, having obtained a qualification is a 
necessary condition for employment as tenured faculty in Italy, but it is not a guarantee of 
employment, and indeed to day several candidates who qualified as associate or full 
professors are still employed in their previous lower position, or may even be unemployed. 
																																								 																				
2    We consider two main research areas classified by	Ministry of Research and University: 01 -	Mathematics 
and computing, and 10 – Humanities and Arts.   
3 Data by Ministry of Research and University, updated to 12/31/2015, available at: 
http://cercauniversita.cineca.it/php5/docenti/cerca.php We consider the scientific field formally known as 
“Economics, SECS-P01”. Some economists are employed in Italian universities within a different subfield, e.g. 
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4 Data by the Ministry of Research and University, available at:  
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5 Until the reform, and for a short transitory period thereafter, there was a further lower-ranked tenured position, 
“ricercatore universitario”, roughly corresponding to a lecturer or assistant professor. Thus, in the sample of 
individuals that we consider there could be some candidates for a qualification even as associate professors, who 
already had tenure (we include them among the “tenured professors candidates for promotion”). 
The reform distinguishes two broad cultural areas: the life and natural sciences, defined by 
law as “bibliometric areas”, and the social sciences and humanities, the “non-bibliometric 
areas”. Within the ASN, different sorts of bibliometric indicators are prescribed for the 
evaluation of candidates in the bibliometric and non-bibliometric areas. According to Law 
240/2010, these indicators should have been complemented by further qualitative criteria 
(such as being on the editorial board of scientific journals, etc.), but in fact the achievement of 
precisely defined thresholds in the bibliometric indexes proved to be decisive, as will be 
shown in the next section.  
For the non-bibliometric areas, including economics, the bibliometric thresholds were defined 
in terms of numbers of publications.6 Specifically, it was expected that a qualified candidate 
would have a number higher than the median of the then tenured economics professors in 
Italy, of the following:  
(i) research monographs, excluding edited volumes;  
(ii) journal articles and book chapters;  
(iii) journal articles in “top journals”, the so-called A-list.  
 
The candidates’ numbers of publications were normalized by “academic age”, i.e. time since 
the first recorded publication, subtracting periods of parental leave. 
These thresholds were formally a reference point and not a mandatory minimum requirement 
for the commissions, composed of five full professors for each discipline, in charge of 
granting the national qualification to each candidate. All commissions were obliged to 
publicly report all material related to their work (i.e. the candidates’ CVs, each candidate’s 
score in the three measures above, and the commission’s narrative evaluation of each 
candidate) on a public website. 
For economics, the first threshold criterion, the number of books, was practically void, 
because the median number of research monographs authored by tenured economists in Italy 
was estimated to be zero. Moreover, since usually younger scholars are more productive than 
older ones, the second criterion, the number of book chapters and journal articles, was 
satisfied by a vast majority of candidates (with obvious self-section of those potential 
candidates who did not meet this criterion, and thus did not apply). Thus, among the 
candidates for qualification in economics, the third criterion proved decisive in most cases. 
Thus, the case of Italy confirms the trend highlighted by Lee (2006), that it is a general 
tendency of supposed research quality assessments to boil down to the sheer definition of 
rankings of supposedly top journals, as the Italian A-list. 
In the Italian case, drafting of the A-list for each discipline was outsourced from the Anvur, 
the national agency for the evaluation of the university system, to a “working group” of 
scholars appointed by its board. The method and criteria underlying the A-list for economics 
were criticized for the lack of pluralism and bias towards certain subfields of economics 
(Corsi et al., 2016). Possibly in response to these criticisms, subsequent updates of the journal 
rankings led to the introduction of one Italian economic journal in the A-list in 2015, and the 
subdivision of rankings by macro-fields. However, these developments are still regarded by 
many as insufficient, and, in the context of the evaluation of universities, 11 Italian economic 
societies coordinated to sign a letter to Anvur criticizing the criteria of journal rankings.7 
These developments may to some extent impact on the future rounds of the ASN, but are not 
relevant for our analysis, which is limited to the 2012 and 2013 rounds (the only completed 
rounds to-day). 
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and journals, as recorded by the databases Web of Science™ of Thomson Reuters and Scopus™ of Elsevier. 
7 Available at http://www.siecon.org/online/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/Lettera-allANVUR-da-SIE-e-altre-
societ%C3%A0-scientifiche.pdf 
  
 
3.2 Data and methodology 
 
We collect the CVs of all candidates to the 2012 and 2013 rounds of the ASN, as they were 
published on the ASN website, and match this information with all the publications indexed 
in EconLit and Google Books by the candidates as well as by all tenured economics 
professors in Italy in the same years.8 These databases allow us to consider relevant metadata 
for each publication from EconLit (abstract, keywords, and JEL codes) and Google Books 
(abstract, and keywords).  
As explained above, we consider diversity both in the demographic composition of 
economists and in their methods and research interests. In order to capture the latter, we 
consider the cases of gender studies,9 heterodox economics, and analyses of specific national 
conditions (most notably with reference to Italy, which arguably should be a relevant field of 
inquiry for Italian economists). 
We use JEL codes to identify three concentric circles of “gender studies” within economics. 
The first, narrowest definition, only considers feminist economics, which is a school of 
heterodox economics whose main aim is (quoting from the mission statement of the 
International Association for Feminist Economics) “to further gender-aware and inclusive 
economic inquiry and policy analysis with the goal of enhancing the well-being of children, 
women, and men in local, national, and transnational communities.” In EconLit, feminist 
economics is denoted by a specific JEL code: B54 – “Feminist Economics”.  
Our intermediate definition, which we label gender economics, encompasses “those areas of 
research that investigate the economic importance of behavior or outcomes specific to women 
and men” (Bettio, 2001, p. 148). In other words, in this group we only consider topics and do 
not consider differences in the methodological approach: as Robeyns (2001) highlights, 
gender economics may refer to both neoclassical or mainstream economics and feminist 
approaches. Under this definition we consider JEL codes B54, and J16 – “Economics of 
Gender”.  
Finally, we consider an even larger aggregate, which arguably includes most topics of 
relevance for economists who work on gender issues,10 in which we consider all JEL codes 
that imply a multidisciplinary approach and/or the concepts of “household”, “time allocation”, 
and “discrimination” (for a complete description of the JEL codes included see table A1 in 
appendix 1). 
Next, following Corsi et al. (2016) we use a mix of JEL codes, keywords and journal rankings 
to identify works in heterodox economics. We start from the identification of a set of JEL 
codes that manifest the heterodox orientation of a publication (listed in table A1 in 
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journals, working paper series, Ph.D. theses and books and book chapters in economics. Entries in EconLit are 
catalogued according to a standardized index of research methods and topics, denoted by alphanumeric symbols 
called “JEL codes”. The full list of JEL codes is reported in table A1 in appendix. 
9 The introduction of the ‘gender studies’ in Italian universities can be dated back at least to 1987, with the 
conference on the status of women’s studies and research in the humanities, held at the University of Modena. 
However, only in 1999 the possibility to offer courses on women’s studies within postgraduate and 
undergraduate programs was introduced. As reported in Antonelli et al. (2013), academic courses on gender 
issues are still limited. 
10 This is not to imply that research on other topics does not concern or encompass gender issues, but only that 
research on these specific JEL codes more frequently adopts a gender perspective or at least separately considers 
men and women’s situation. 
appendix).11 Next, we define as mainstream, even if they use a potentially heterodox JEL 
code, all journal articles published in a set of core mainstream journals, and we add as 
heterodox, again independently of the JEL codes used, all journal articles published in a core 
list of heterodox journals.12 Finally, we classify an economist as heterodox if s/he ever 
authored or co-authored at least two publications that are defined as heterodox according to 
the above criteria. On the whole, this conservative methodological stance is justified by our 
aim of identifying those publications that were most likely to be seen as deviating from the 
mainstream by the commission in charge of granting the qualification.  
Finally, we use titles, abstracts, JEL codes and keywords to identify works that deal with the 
Italian, the European and/or the US economies. Specifically, we identify publications that 
include in any of the mentioned metadata fields respectively the words “Italy” or “Italian”; 
“Europe”, “European Union”, “EU”, “Euro” or “Eurozone”; and “American”, “US”, “USA” 
or “United States of America”.13 
 
 
3.3 Descriptive statistics  
 
As shown in table 1, of the 345 candidates for a qualification to full professorship and 525 
candidates for associate professorship, women constitute 22% and 35% respectively. 
Therefore, women are underrepresented among candidates even with respect to their presence 
in the immediately lower rank (as mentioned in section 2, 32% of associate professors and 
46% of researchers are women).14  
Less than 10% of candidates decided to withdraw their application once the names of the 
commission members were revealed. This may indicate that most potential candidates had 
already internalized the selection criteria and did not apply on the first place, if they thought 
they would not meet those standards; or, that their uncertainty concerning these criteria was 
not reduced after the selection of the commission members. In any case, women are a 
majority of the candidates who decided to step down, even more frequently if they already 
had tenure at a lower rank. 
 
 
TABLES 1 AND 2 AROUND HERE 
 
 
Table 2 highlights that the differences between men’s and women’s scores in the three 
threshold criteria recommended by the reform law are not substantial. By definition, all 
candidates met the first criterion, on the number of books standardized by academic age, 
because the threshold was set at zero. A vast majority of candidates met the other two criteria 
as well, thus suggesting that these were widely regarded as necessary conditions for obtaining 
																																								 																				
11 We consider two major exceptions: we define as not necessarily or not manifestly heterodox those 
publications that use “New Keynesian” as keyword alongside JEL code E12 (Keynes, Keynesian, Post-
Keynesian), or the keyword “Schumpeterian” in conjunction with JEL code B52 (Institutional, Evolutionary). 
12 Both lists are taken from Corsi et al. (2016), to which we refer for more details. 
13 All data was preliminary processed with the aim of eliminating all variations due to capital letters, 
conjugations of the terms in Italian language, punctuation and spacing. 
14 Scoppa and De Paola (2016) analyze the determinants of applying at the ASN by considering as potential 
candidates all academics employed at Italian universities in the immediately lower rank. This procedure probably 
captures a vast majority of potential and actual candidates, but it is arbitrary to the extent that no such restriction 
was laid down (e.g. there were candidates from non-university research centers, foreign countries, untenured 
academics, and tenured academics of lower ranks, such as researchers candidates for full professorship). 
a qualification. However, table 3 shows that this pattern corresponds to a more mixed picture 
in terms of candidates’ publications.  
On average, women candidates wrote a similar number of books to men, but fewer book 
chapters and journal articles. Among men, the candidates who qualified to associate 
professorship wrote more publications than those who did not qualify, while for women the 
difference is not statistically significant. Specifically, for both men and women the successful 
candidates to associate professorship wrote more journal articles than their unsuccessful 
counterparts; however, the former wrote significantly fewer books than the latter. For 
candidates to full professorship, this peculiar finding is confirmed across the board: on 
average successful candidates wrote a smaller number of all kinds of publications (with the 
only exception of journal articles for women). Finally, among women the candidates who 
withdrew from the competition had written significantly fewer books and book chapters, but 
not fewer journal articles; for men the they had written fewer book chapters only. 
In conclusion, it appears that a strong self-selection of candidates took place, on the basis of 
the three government-mandated bibliometric criteria. A non-negligible number of candidates 
decided to step down after having initially applied at the ASN, but they do not seem to be less 
productive than the others. For those who stayed in the competition, productivity does not 
appear to having been a prime determinant of the outcome, and it actually seems to have 
impaired the chances of qualification for candidates to full professorship. Two main 
hypotheses may explain this finding: candidates who had written more publications at the 
time of the ASN could have been the older, presumably less competitive ones; and/or the 
perceived quality of publications, or other characteristics such their field or methodological 
orientation, may have outweigh the relevance of their sheer number. In order to assess these 
hypotheses, in the next section we carried out a multivariate analysis of the determinants of 
qualifying to the ASN.  
 
 
4. Does breaking the glass ceiling imply homologation? 
 
 
In order to investigate the relevance of perceived quality, we consider the classifications 
detailed in section 3.3 and two additional indicators. We first consider candidates’ visibility in 
EconLit, by computing the share of a candidate’s publications, as listed in their CVs, that are 
indexed in EconLit. As shown in table 4, the candidates who did not qualify at the ASN have 
a significantly lower visibility on EconLit, whereas those who withdrew have roughly average 
values. Then, we consider candidates’ mean number of coauthors; the differences between 
candidates who qualified and who did not qualify are smaller than those in visibility, but 
again they are almost always statistically significant.  
Concerning research fields, we find virtually no candidates with publications in feminist or 
even gender economics, except for those who decide to withdraw before the end of the 
procedure. Rather, a focus on broadly defined gender-sensitive topics proves very fashionable 
among the candidates (as in academia in general, see D’Ippoliti, 2011) and it is often 
associated with better chances of success at the ASN. The degree of feminization of a 
candidate’s main JEL code (that in which he or she wrote most, determined by 1-letter JEL 
code) appears uncorrelated with the outcome of the ASN. In contrast, the share of a 
candidate’s main JEL code within the top ten economics journals (in the previous 5-year 
period) significantly affected a candidate’s chances at the full professorship rank. Heterodox 
economists are disproportionately overrepresented among candidates who did not qualify at 
the ASN, though the difference is often not statistically significant. Similarly, having written 
about Europe or the USA does not appear to systematically correlate with a certain outcome. 
However, especially noteworthy is the evidence that having written publications with 
metadata that include the word “Italy” appears to be associated with lower chances of 
qualifying, with the only exception of women candidates for associate professorship. 
 
 
TABLES 3 AND 4 AROUND HERE 
 
 
In order to test the robustness of these findings, we run probit regressions on the probability 
of qualifying at the ASN. We consider as explanatory variables candidates’ demographic 
characteristics, their production, their scores in three bibliometric criteria, the topics of their 
research, and – for candidates who had already tenure in an Italian university – a number of 
characteristics of their institution. In order to allow for the possibility that the candidates who 
withdrew from the competition exhibit some systematic characteristic, which may be 
correlated with the other cnadidates’ outcome at the ASN, we run a probit regression with 
sample selection (Van de Ven and Van Pragg, 1981). Results are reported in table 5 for the 
whole sample, and in table 6 for the sample of tenured candidates (including characteristics of 
their institution).  
As shown in table 5, the correlation between the error term in the probit for the selection 
equation and in the main probit (!) is statistically significant in the full sample, and in all 
model specifications the likelihood-ratio tests do not reject at the 10% significant level that 
data on the candidates are censured. This implies that information on the candidates who 
withdrew from the competition must be considered, and the simple probit estimates may be 
biased. In contrast, in the Italian sample (table 6), we do not find evidence of correlation 
between the selection equation and the main probit error terms. However, in both samples the 
two models return similar results, with the exception of very few variables that had to be 
dropped in some specifications due to problems in the estimation procedure (in the form of 
perfect prediction for some individuals). 
 
 
TABLES 5 AND 6 AROUND HERE 
 
 
Concerning demographic characteristics, as already noticed by Scoppa and De Paola (2016) 
we find that age and sex exerted an impact on candidates’ decision to withdraw from the 
competition. Younger candidates were more likely to withdraw, as were women (though in 
the Italian sample only). Similarly, the region of the candidate’s institution in Italy was 
relevant in the choice to withdraw the application, as was the public nature of the university 
(again, in the Italian sample only). In contrast, the institution’s size, measured by the number 
of tenured faculty, and its feminization, measured by the share of women faculty, do not 
appear to having played a role, except for the feminization of the institution for women 
candidates. 
Considering the candidates who did not withdraw from the competition, age does not appear 
to have significantly affected a candidate’s chances of qualifying, with the exception of one 
specification only on the full sample. Significantly, being a woman proved a hurdle in the 
competition for qualification to full professorship, as highlighted by the interaction term 
between the two dummy variables.15  
																																								 																				
15 This result is confirmed by separate estimates for candidates to full professorship only. More results are 
available from the authors upon request. 
As is well known, the interpretation of interaction terms in probit regressions is complicated 
by their non-linearity. Thus, we estimate the impact of being woman for candidates for 
associate and full professorship along the whole empirical distribution of the predicted 
probability of qualifying at the ASN. Such impact was obtained by computing the difference 
between a candidate’s predicted probability of qualifying, if he or she was a woman and if he 
or she was a man, given all other observed characteristics. As shown in figure 1, for 
candidates for associate professorship the change in the predicted probability of qualifying is 
negligible. However, for candidates for full professorship we find a double U-shaped relation: 
one for men, under the theoretical assumption that they were women, and the other for 
women, under the assumption that they were men. Such U-shapes denote that for candidates 
with very high or very low predicted probabilities of qualifying, their sex did not provide a 
significant boost (to men) or hindrance (for women). However, for all “intermediate” 
candidates, for whom we estimate similar probabilities of qualifying and of not qualifying, 
being a woman implied a significant reduction in the predicted probability to qualify as full 
professor.  
Measures of perceived quality of the publications always exert a significantly positive impact 
on the probability to qualify: this applies to a candidate’s visibility on EconLit, his or her 
mean number of coauthors, and the third bibliometric criterion postulated by the reform law 
(that is, on the normalized of articles in A-list journals). 
In contrast, the first and second bibliometric criteria, denoting measures of productivity such 
as respectively the normalized number of books and the normalized number of book chapters 
and journal articles, are often not statistically significant. Moreover, when they are, they 
exhibit a negative sign. This surprising result implies that writing books or book chapters and 
articles on lower ranked journals is not just irrelevant, with the aim of a career at an Italian 
university: it actively damaged a candidate’s chances. 
Finally, concerning research topics, we compute the number of different JEL codes used by a 
candidate, over the total number of JEL codes he or she used. We find that having wide 
research interests, measured by the share of different JEL codes used, negatively affected a 
candidate’s predicted probability of qualifying at the ASN.  
While writing on broadly speaking gender-sensitive topics exerted a strong, positive impact, 
the feminization of a candidates’ main JEL code does not appear to having significantly 
affected candidates’ chances (it was impossible to include feminist or gender economics in 
the estimates, due to the small number of candidates who wrote on any of these topics). 
Similarly, we find that the trendiness of candidates’ research interests, measured by the share 
of their main JEL code in the top 10 economics journals, positively affected their probability 
of qualifying as full professors, whereas being a heterodox economist exerted a negative 
impact. Indeed, as shown in figure 2, in terms of changes in the predicted probabilities we 
find for heterodox economics a similar pattern to that of being woman, denoting a sort of 
glass ceiling. 
Finally, a candidate’s use of the terms Europe or USA does not seem to having exerted a 
significant impact on their probability to qualify at the ASN, whereas in the full sample 
writing on Italy has a significantly negative impact (it looses statistical significance, though, 
once we include the heterodox economist dummy variable). Again, the interpretation of these 
findings requires some caution due to the non-linearity of the probit model. As shown in 
figure 4, the “USA” dummy variable is found to exert a negligible impact in the sense that it 
is not estimated to having significantly changed candidates’ predicted probability to qualify 
along the whole distribution. In contrast, as shown in figure 3, writing about Italy is found to 
have opposite effects for candidates at the associate and full professorship levels: for the 
former, it is estimated to increase a candidate’s probability by more than 4%; for the latter, 
writing about Italy proved a significant obstacle, reducing a candidate’s predicted probability 
to qualify to full professorship by as much as 15%. 
 
 
5. Conclusions  
 
Italy has followed several other countries (such as the UK, France, and Australia), adopting 
methods of research evaluation strongly shaped by bibliometric indicators. In the case of the 
selection and promotion of individual researchers, through the ASN, these methods were 
formalized by law, through three indexes: two roughly measuring productivity, and one for 
research “quality”. Our analysis shows that gross measures of research quality played a 
significant role in determining the procedure’s outcome, whereas productivity may even have 
proved a hindrance to candidates for promotion. 
These processes are not gender neutral, and reinforce – possibly providing a technical 
coverage to – the gender glass ceiling in academia. However, we document that not all 
women are treated the same way, and not all men stand to gain from the system as new forms 
of glass ceilings emerge from the bibliometric quantification of “research excellence”.  
Specifically, our analysis shows that the Italian system ended up favoring some research 
approaches and methods over others, at the detriment of diversity both of the academic 
workforce and of research programs in economics. Candidates who authored books, or who 
wrote with few coauthors and/or on topics that are not fashionable on the top economics 
journals, stood lower chances to qualify as associate or full professors even controlling for the 
“quality” of their research, their productivity and a large number of observable characteristics. 
These findings are relevant in so far as diversity of researchers and of research methods and 
topics is fundamental to the scientific advancement of economics. However, they are even 
more relevant for “peripheral countries” such as Italy, which stand to loose from the 
reorientation of economic research away from the analysis of their own economy and towards 
the study of internationally fashionable topics. 
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Table 1 – Descriptive statistics 
 
 
Candidates for full 
professorship 
Candidates for 
associate professorship 
Withdrawn 
candidates 
 
  Qualified   Qualified   
Tenured  
prof. 
Total 345 48.3% 525 47.7% 72 62.5% 
% women 22% 31.6% 34.5% 39.8% 58.3% 63.3% 
 
Notes:  “qualified” denotes the percentage of candidates of qualified for the National Scientific Qualification (ASN); “% women” 
always refers to column share, i.e. the percentage of women among candidates and among qualified candidates, respectively; 
“tenured prof.” reports the row share, i.e. the percentage of tenured professors among withdrawn candidates and women withdrawn 
candidates, respectively. 
 
 
 
Table 2 – Bibliometric indicators  
 
 
I criterion: # of 
monographs 
II criterion: # of journal 
articles and book 
chapters 
 
III criterion: # of 
articles in “A-list” 
journals 
 Women 
Met the threshold 100% 77.7% 74.7% 
Mean value 0.7 15.5 3.2 
s.d. 1.8 8.4 3.6 
 
Men 
Met the threshold 100% 82% 82% 
Mean value 0.8 18.5 4.4 
s.d. 1.5 13 4.3 
 
Notes:  the commission in charge of granting the ASN had no legal obligation to grant a qualification to every candidate who met the 
threshold criteria, but in general it was expected to. Thresholds in all three indicators were defined as the respective median values 
among tenured economics professors in Italian universities: in both rounds considered here these values were estimated by the 
National Agency for the Evaluation of Research respectively at 0 (normalized number of books), 12.11 (normalized number of 
journal articles and book chapters) and 1.5 (normalized number of articles in A-list journals) for full professorship, and 0, 11 and 2 
for associate professorship. 
  
  
Table 3 – Productivity of candidates and withdrawn candidates 
 
 
Candidates for full 
professorship 
Candidates for associate 
professorship Withdrawn 
candidates 
Qualified Not qualified Qualified Not qualified 
Women 
Publications 
mean 28.7 38.6 19 17.9 19.4 
  t (74) = 2.03* t (179) = -0.55 t (361) = 0.24 
s.d. 11.2 22.7 14.4 13 12.7 
Journal 
articles 
mean 16 15.7 9.9 7.8 11.1 
   t (74) = -0.14 t (179) =  -2.2*  t (361) = -0.86 
s.d. 8.1 7.5 6.5 5.8 7.1 
Books 
mean 1 2 0.6 1 0.3 
  t (74) = 1.76* t (179) =  1.88*  t (361) = 1.98* 
s.d. 2.2 2.4 1.2 1.8 0.7 
Book chapters 
mean 3.4 9.3 4 5.1 1 
  t (74) = 3.04** t (179) =  1.51 t (361) = 2.81** 
s.d. 2.7 9.3 4.9 4.8 2.5 
  Men  
Publications 
mean 32.5 41.8 24.8 18.2 24.4 
   t (267) = 3.08** t (342) = -3.57** t (885) = 0.39 
s.d. 20.9 27.9 18.5 15.5 18.4 
Journal 
articles 
mean 17.4 21.4 14 8.8 13.5 
  t (267)  = 2.43*  t (342) = -4.96*** t (885)  = 0.34 
s.d. 11.6 15.5 11.2 8.2 9.9 
Books 
mean 0.9 2.4 0.7 1.4 0.9 
  t (267) = 5.15*** t (342) = 2.61**  t (885) = 0.72 
s.d. 1.6 3 1.3 3.6 1.6 
Book chapters 
mean 5.2 9.8 4.1 4.5 3 
  t (267) = 4.43*** t (342) = 0.68 t (885) = 1.95* 
s.d. 7.6 9.3 5.9 5.3 4.5 
 
Notes: the table reports the candidates’ number of publications at the time of applying for the ASN. The classification of publication 
types was obtained from EconLit and Google Scholar. For withdrawn candidates, the test statistics report comparisons with all non-
withdrawn candidates.
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Table 5 – Probability of qualifying: full sample  
 
 
 
 
 
*** p < 0.01,  ** p < 0.05,  * p < 0.1 
 
Notes: heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses. Equations (1), (4) and (7) report simple probit estimates; eqs. (2), (5) 
and (5) report censored probit estimates, and eqs. (3), (6) and (9) report the respective robust selection equation probit estimates. 
 
 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Probit Censored Probit
Selection 
equation Probit
Censored 
Probit
Selection 
equation Probit
Censored 
Probit
Selection 
equation
Year of birth -0.0112 -0.0143 -0.0351*** -0.00993 -0.0133 -0.0323** -0.0156 -0.0185* -0.0331***
(0.00954) (0.00921) (0.0124) (0.0101) (0.00969) (0.0129) (0.0103) (0.00990) (0.0128)
Woman -0.119 -0.144 -0.194 0.0888 0.0433 -0.185 0.0735 0.0279 -0.178
(0.116) (0.113) (0.134) (0.144) (0.139) (0.136) (0.146) (0.141) (0.137)
Candidate to full professorship -0.226 -0.196 0.166 -0.465* -0.426* 0.182 -0.487** -0.447* 0.178
(0.139) (0.138) (0.166) (0.247) (0.238) (0.168) (0.247) (0.238) (0.167)
Full professorship * Woman -0.649** -0.611** -0.660** -0.621**
(0.256) (0.242) (0.257) (0.244)
First criterion (B) -0.0224 -0.0194 -0.0124 -0.0109 -1.89e-05 0.00151
(0.0411) (0.0403) (0.0505) (0.0490) (0.0509) (0.0494)
Second criterion (JA+BC) -0.0150** -0.0144** -0.0210*** -0.0201*** -0.0177** -0.0173**
(0.00596) (0.00576) (0.00708) (0.00675) (0.00743) (0.00713)
Third criterion (A-list) 0.158*** 0.148*** 0.161*** 0.148*** 0.169*** 0.156***
(0.0283) (0.0289) (0.0292) (0.0289) (0.0311) (0.0305)
Central Italy 0.130 0.0727 -0.504*** 0.142 0.0708 -0.506*** 0.176 0.103 -0.501***
(0.132) (0.131) (0.180) (0.138) (0.135) (0.180) (0.139) (0.136) (0.181)
Southern Italy 0.134 0.0746 -0.486*** 0.149 0.0710 -0.520*** 0.0987 0.0266 -0.522***
(0.146) (0.143) (0.185) (0.151) (0.146) (0.187) (0.150) (0.145) (0.187)
Public university 0.0973 0.0909 0.182 0.0419 0.0359 0.204 0.0842 0.0735 0.215
(0.177) (0.172) (0.220) (0.192) (0.183) (0.222) (0.185) (0.178) (0.223)
Foreign institution 0.0216 0.0504 0.142 -0.0482 -0.0170 0.177 -0.0392 -0.0117 0.183
(0.217) (0.211) (0.304) (0.232) (0.223) (0.313) (0.231) (0.222) (0.317)
Research centre 2.54e-05 -0.0207 -0.313 -1.94e-05 -0.0223 -0.280 0.0331 0.0150 -0.305
(0.351) (0.345) (0.445) (0.355) (0.347) (0.447) (0.341) (0.332) (0.435)
Average number of  coauthors 0.271*** 0.274*** 0.285*** 0.284*** 0.233** 0.238**
(0.103) (0.0985) (0.110) (0.104) (0.113) (0.107)
Visibility on EconLit 1.487*** 1.400*** 1.208*** 1.096*** 1.275*** 1.157***
(0.226) (0.222) (0.292) (0.284) (0.297) (0.291)
Wrote about the USA 0.0148 -0.000428 -0.00407 -0.0244 0.0226 0.000128
(0.144) (0.139) (0.150) (0.142) (0.156) (0.147)
Wrote about Europe -0.132 -0.125 -0.0819 -0.0760 -0.0985 -0.0922
(0.136) (0.129) (0.150) (0.141) (0.151) (0.142)
Wrote about Italy -0.223 -0.208 0.138 0.146 0.201 0.205
(0.204) (0.197) (0.253) (0.240) (0.261) (0.246)
Full professorship * Wrote on Italy -0.710* -0.697* -0.628 -0.615
(0.431) (0.408) (0.422) (0.399)
Feminization of main JEL code 2.287 2.075 1.361 1.187
(1.784) (1.698) (1.812) (1.725)
Wide interests -1.174*** -1.138*** -1.165*** -1.133***
(0.325) (0.310) (0.332) (0.318)
Share of main JEL code in top 10 journals 0.00339 0.00262 0.00406 0.00344
(0.0132) (0.0125) (0.0134) (0.0128)
Full professorship * Top 10 journals 0.0310 0.0308 0.0297 0.0293
(0.0200) (0.0191) (0.0203) (0.0195)
Heterodox economist -0.640*** -0.602***
(0.194) (0.187)
Wrote on gender-relevant topics 8.329***
(0.356)
Not tenured 0.667*** 0.637*** 0.651***
(0.155) (0.149) (0.152)
Journal articles (JA) -0.0201*** -0.0186*** -0.0190***
(0.00701) (0.00704) (0.00700)
Books (B) 0.0539 0.0459 0.0466
(0.0506) (0.0521) (0.0523)
Book chapters (BC) 0.0779*** 0.0788*** 0.0780***
(0.0241) (0.0243) (0.0244)
Constant 20.47 26.63 70.34*** 18.43 25.03 64.82** 29.67 35.48* 66.38***
(18.76) (18.13) (24.64) (19.85) (19.05) (25.58) (20.24) (19.48) (25.40)
Observations 789 861 861 737 809 809 728 809 809
Withdrawn candidates 72 72 72
Rho 0.598 0.680 0.668
(0.211) (0.192) (0.193)
Wald test of indep. eqns. (rho = 0): chi2(1) 4.416** 5.431** 5.386**
 
Table 6 – Probability of qualifying: Italian candidates 
 
 
 
 
 
*** p < 0.01,  ** p < 0.05,  * p < 0.1 
 
Notes: heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses. Equations (10), (13), (16) and (19) report probit estimates; eqs. (11), 
(14), (17) and (20) report censored probit estimates, and eqs. (12), (15), (18) and (21) report the respective selection equation probit 
estimates. 
 
  
(10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21)
Probit Censored Probit
Selection 
equation Probit
Censored 
Probit
Selection 
equation Probit
Censored 
Probit
Selection 
equation Probit
Censored 
Probit
Selection 
equation
Year of birth -0.0128 -0.00783 -0.0248* -0.0105 -0.0101 -0.0222* -0.0105 -0.0113 -0.0213 -0.0159 -0.0150 -0.0219*
(0.0116) (0.0136) (0.0134) (0.0124) (0.0151) (0.0134) (0.0124) (0.0149) (0.0144) (0.0127) (0.0136) (0.0133)
Woman -0.123 -0.0951 -0.715** 0.117 -0.0908 -0.692* 0.117 0.113 -0.631 0.102 0.105 -0.684*
(0.131) (0.135) (0.286) (0.162) (0.146) (0.370) (0.162) (0.167) (0.487) (0.163) (0.163) (0.357)
Candidate to full professorship -0.471*** -0.463*** -0.00519 -0.762*** -0.632*** 0.0498 -0.762*** -0.757** 0.0676 -0.805*** -0.807*** 0.0540
(0.162) (0.158) (0.162) (0.288) (0.168) (0.172) (0.288) (0.296) (0.189) (0.283) (0.282) (0.172)
Full professorship * Woman -0.718** -0.718** -0.721** -0.768** -0.761**
(0.296) (0.296) (0.296) (0.300) (0.304)
First criterion (B) -0.0633 -0.0709 -0.0747 -0.0848 -0.0747 -0.0729 -0.0570 -0.0586
(0.0504) (0.0494) (0.0589) (0.0607) (0.0589) (0.0606) (0.0598) (0.0594)
Second criterion (JA+BC) -0.0168** -0.0167** -0.0231*** -0.0229*** -0.0231*** -0.0230*** -0.0192** -0.0193**
(0.00692) (0.00689) (0.00871) (0.00816) (0.00871) (0.00878) (0.00910) (0.00909)
Third criterion (A-list) 0.208*** 0.205*** 0.213*** 0.207*** 0.213*** 0.212*** 0.225*** 0.225***
(0.0358) (0.0356) (0.0341) (0.0367) (0.0341) (0.0394) (0.0366) (0.0365)
Central Italy 0.212 0.276* -0.370** 0.245* 0.226 -0.378** 0.245* 0.228 -0.384** 0.262* 0.278 -0.380**
(0.141) (0.153) (0.181) (0.149) (0.211) (0.186) (0.149) (0.245) (0.194) (0.149) (0.172) (0.186)
Southern Italy 0.177 0.235 -0.336* 0.181 0.211 -0.361* 0.181 0.167 -0.364* 0.121 0.134 -0.361*
(0.153) (0.160) (0.188) (0.157) (0.195) (0.191) (0.157) (0.214) (0.197) (0.157) (0.169) (0.192)
Public university 0.0475 0.0853 -0.533* -0.0449 -0.0478 -0.545* -0.0449 -0.0525 -0.565* 0.0375 0.0460 -0.553*
(0.191) (0.194) (0.300) (0.205) (0.220) (0.307) (0.205) (0.221) (0.301) (0.197) (0.202) (0.294)
Average number of  coauthors 0.356*** 0.324** 0.398*** 0.369*** 0.398*** 0.399*** 0.319** 0.316**
(0.122) (0.139) (0.129) (0.128) (0.129) (0.129) (0.135) (0.133)
Visibility on EconLit 1.447*** 1.409*** 1.139*** 0.997*** 1.139*** 1.123*** 1.256*** 1.268***
(0.267) (0.310) (0.358) (0.354) (0.358) (0.418) (0.364) (0.368)
Wrote about the USA -0.0660 -0.0546 -0.127 -0.123 -0.127 -0.129 -0.0493 -0.0459
(0.172) (0.163) (0.180) (0.178) (0.180) (0.180) (0.180) (0.179)
Wrote about Europe -0.161 -0.159 -0.0974 -0.143 -0.0974 -0.0957 -0.0931 -0.0943
(0.158) (0.150) (0.173) (0.165) (0.173) (0.175) (0.174) (0.174)
Wrote about Italy -0.181 -0.172 0.217 -0.108 0.217 0.220 0.284 0.279
(0.238) (0.229) (0.277) (0.240) (0.277) (0.274) (0.288) (0.286)
Full professorship * Wrote on Italy -0.744 -0.744 -0.747 -0.686 -0.679
(0.490) (0.490) (0.487) (0.482) (0.479)
Feminization of main JEL code 0.627 0.429 0.627 0.644 0.274 0.265
(2.067) (2.037) (2.067) (2.060) (2.093) (2.086)
Wide interests -1.007*** -1.053** -1.007*** -1.011*** -1.008** -0.998**
(0.391) (0.415) (0.391) (0.390) (0.400) (0.403)
Share of main JEL code in top 10 journals -0.00632 0.0124 -0.00632 -0.00629 -0.00902 -0.00906
(0.0153) (0.0115) (0.0153) (0.0152) (0.0155) (0.0155)
Full professorship * Top 10 journals 0.0457** 0.0457** 0.0457** 0.0478** 0.0477**
(0.0229) (0.0229) (0.0229) (0.0232) (0.0232)
Heterodox economist -0.678*** -0.680***
(0.237) (0.237)
Wrote on gender-relevant topics 6.394*** 5.780*** 5.634***
(0.363) (0.317) (0.255)
Journal articles (JA) -0.0205** -0.0213*** -0.0211*** -0.0212***
(0.00897) (0.00734) (0.00758) (0.00727)
Books (B) 0.0753 0.0574 0.0520 0.0563
(0.0539) (0.0596) (0.0589) (0.0568)
Book chapters (BC) 0.0687*** 0.0697*** 0.0711*** 0.0699***
(0.0233) (0.0231) (0.0246) (0.0229)
Feminization of university 0.449 0.633 0.801 0.684
(1.014) (1.162) (1.041) (0.922)
Woman * Feminization of university 1.904* 1.772 1.548 1.729
(0.995) (1.354) (1.630) (1.229)
Size of university 7.68e-05 6.78e-05 5.67e-05 6.45e-05
(9.34e-05) (0.000106) (0.000104) (9.60e-05)
Constant 23.49 13.87 50.67* 19.55 19.06 45.53* 19.55 21.14 43.73 30.19 28.52 45.05*
(22.83) (26.63) (26.45) (24.35) (29.79) (26.56) (24.35) (29.32) (28.46) (24.89) (26.68) (26.25)
Observations 623 684 684 578 645 645 578 645 645 578 645 645
Withdrawn candidates 61 61 61 61
Rho -0.636 -0.248 0.143 -0.141   
(0.790) (1.356) (1.548) (0.738)
Wald test of indep. eqns. (ρ = 0): χ2(1) 0.321 0.031 0.008 0.035
 
 
Figures 1 and 2 – The gender and heterodox glass ceilings 
 
Marginal effect of being woman, by rank 
 
 
 
Marginal effect of being an heterodox 
economist, by rank  
 
 
 
Notes: the figures show the difference in the predicted probability of qualifying for the ASN as a function of certain observable 
correlates. Predicted probabilities are estimated by selection probit model, specification eq. (20) shown in table 6. 
 
 
Figures 3 and 4 – The impacts of writing about Italy and the USA 
 
Marginal effect of having written about Italy,  
by rank 
 
 
Marginal effect of having written about the 
USA, by rank 
 
 
 
Notes: the figures show the difference in the predicted probability of qualifying for the ASN as a function of certain observable 
correlates. Predicted probabilities are estimated by selection probit model, specification eq. (20) shown in table 6. 
 
 
 
 
  
Appendix 1 – Aggregations of JEL codes  
 
 
H
eterodox 
E
conom
ics 
G
ender-sensitive 
topics
Fem
inist and 
gender 
E
conom
ics 
H
eterodox 
E
conom
ics 
G
ender-sensitive 
topics
Fem
inist and 
gender 
E
conom
ics 
A11 - Role of Economics; Role of 
Economists X J220 - Time Allocation and Labor Supply
X A12 - Relation of Economics to Other Disciplines J230 - Labor Demand
X A13 - Relation of Economics to Social Values
J240 - Human Capital; Skills; Occupational 
Choice; Labor Productivity
A14 - Sociology of Economics J260 - Retirement; Retirement Policies
B0 -History of Economic Thought, 
Methodology, and Heterodox 
Approaches
J280 - Safety; Job Satisfaction; Related Public 
Policy
B1 - History of Economic Thought 
through 1925 X
J290 - Time Allocation, Work Behavior, and 
Employment Determination: Other
B2 - History of Economic Thought 
since 1925 J300 - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs
B3 - History of Economic Thought: 
Individuals X
J310 - Wage Level and Structure; Wage 
Differentials
X B50 - Current Heterodox Approaches J320 - Nonwage Labor Costs and Benefits; Private Pensions
X X X B54 - Feminist Economics J380 - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs: Public Policy
D10 - Household Behavior: General J390 - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs: Other
D13 - Household Production and 
Intrahousehold Allocation J400 - Particular Labor Markets
X D19 - Household Behavior and Family Economics: Other
J5 - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, 
and Collective Bargaining: 
H31 - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of 
Economic Agents: Households J6 - Mobility, Unemployment, and Vacancies
H51 - National Government 
Expenditures and Health X J7 - Labor Discrimination
H52 - National Government 
Expenditures and Education J8 - Labor Standards
H53 - National Government 
Expenditures and Welfare Programs
L30 - Nonprofit Organizations and Public 
Enterprise
H54 - National Government 
Expenditures and Related Policies L31 - Nonprofit Institutions; NGOs
H55 - Social Security and Public 
Pensions
L39 - Nonprofit Organizations and Public 
Enterprise: Other
H75 - State and Local Government: 
Health; Education; Welfare; Public 
Pensions
O0 - Economic Development, Technological 
Change, and Growth
I00 - Health, Education, and Welfare: 
General O1 - Economic Development
I11 - Analysis of Health Care Markets O2 - Development Planning and Policy
I14 - Health and Inequality O22 - Project Analysis
I15 - Health and Economic 
Development O29 - Development Planning and Policy: Other
I18 - Health: Government Policy; 
Regulation; Public Health
O30 - Technological Change; Research and 
Development; Intellectual Property Rights
I19 - Health: Other O31 - Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives
I2 - Education and Research Institutions O38 - Technological Change: Government Policy
I3 - Welfare and Poverty O39 - Technological Change: Other
J0 - Labor and Demographic Economics O40 - Economic Growth and Aggregate Productivity
J01 - Labor Economics O43 - Institutions and Growth
J08 - Labor Economics Policies O44 - Environment and Growth
J10 - Demographic Economics
O47 - Measurement of Economic Growth; 
Aggregate Productivity; Cross-Country Output 
Convergence
J11 - Demographic Trends, 
Macroeconomic Effects, and Forecasts
O49 - Economic Growth and Aggregate 
Productivity: Other
X J12 - Marriage; Marital Dissolution; Family Structure; Domestic Abuse
P46 - Other Economic Systems: Consumer 
Economics; Health; Education and Training; 
Welfare, Income, Wealth, and Poverty
X J13 - Fertility; Family Planning; Child Care; Children; Youth Q01 - Sustainable Development
X
J14 - Economics of the Elderly; 
Economics of the Handicapped; Non-
labor Market Discrimination
X R20 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics; Household Analysis
X
J15 - Economics of Minorities, Races, 
and Immigrants; Non-labor 
Discrimination
R23 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and 
Transportation Economics; Regional Migration; 
Regional Labor Markets; Population
X X J160 - Economics of Gender; Non-labor Discrimination X
R29 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and 
Transportation Economics; Household Analysis: 
Other
J170 - Value of Life; Forgone Income Z10 - Cultural Economics; Economic Sociology; Economic Anthropology
J180 - Demographic Economics: Public 
Policy
Z13 - Economic Sociology; Economic 
Anthropology; Social and Economic 
Stratification
J190 - Demographic Economics: Other
J200 - Demand and Supply of Labor
J210 - Labor Force and Employment, 
Size, and Structure
